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Abstract
In this paper we document a process of price convergence in the European market for phar-
maceuticals and relate it to access to innovative medicines in individual countries. The EU is a
peculiar case study, where free circulation of goods exists, but pricing policies are designed and im-
plemented by Member States. Thanks to a unique census database on product sales and launches
for fteen EU countries, we detect a process of price convergence, both in nominal and in real
terms. Therefore, we nd that a faster rate of price convergence and a lower income per capita are
associated with stronger delays in launches of new medicines. Moreover, country delays tend to
be higher for innovative and rst in class chemical compounds. Our results suggest that ine¢cien-
cies arise from drugs regulation, when countries widely di¤er in income per capita, public nance
sustainability conditions, and regulatory frameworks. Policies of external reference pricing tend to
exacerbate welfare losses. A policy of di¤erential pricing is suggested, in order to take into account
both therapeutic value and willingness to pay.
JEL classication: F15; I11; L65; L11; L51
Keywords: economic integration, price convergence, product launches, European Single Mar-
ket, healthcare, pharmaceutical industry, pricing.
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1 Introduction
We study how market integration in the European Union can a¤ect the di¤usion of new medicines,
in a context of separate National Systems of Regulation (see Gambardella, Orsenigo, Pammolli, 2000;
McKelvey, Orsenigo, Pammolli, 2004).
The case of the European Union (EU) is peculiar. Despite striving for continental economic inte-
gration, each member country maintains its own pricing and reimbursement policies on pharmaceutical
markets. Albeit fragmented, national regulations throughout the EU members share some core pric-
ing and reimbursement mechanisms (Carone, Schwiers and Xavier, 2012). Most EU members rely on
external benchmarking, for which a price limit in the domestic country can be set according to what
other foreign countries already pay (external reference pricing).
However, national pricing policies originally designed for cost-containment in pharmaceutical ex-
penditure can have spillovers in presence of interdependent markets (Danzon and Chao, 2012; Lanjouw,
2005), when companies choose to delay entering in low-price countries, in order to avoid undermining
prots coming from high-price countries. Moreover, the current EU legal framework allows parallel
imports from low-cost Member Countries.1
Preliminary evidence shows that, in the period 2002- 2012, the intra-EU pharmaceutical trade
increased threefold, with respect to a mere 50% in overall manufacturing (Eurostat). This is consistent
with an overall price convergence that we detect across European countries, as a removal of institutional
barriers allows for arbitrage opportunities from countries where pharmaceuticals are the cheapest.
In general, the European Commission has only limited tasks in strengthening cooperation and
coordination among member states, although the importance of cooperation has been enshrined in
the Lisbon Treaty since 2009. However, an explicit reference to the principle of subsidiarity excludes
the possibility of intervening at the European level to dene the allocation of resources devoted to
management of healthcare, which is left to single member States.2
In this context, there is a clear need to establish how relationships between market integration,
prices and patientsaccess to medicine are evolving. To date, evidence has focused on small product
samples, considering some selected countries or therapeutic markets, without a specic focus on the
European common market.
We nd evidence of a relatively fast market integration in the European pharmaceutical market
after exploiting the census of pharmaceutical products provided by IMS Health MIDAS across 15
European countries, for which we possess the complete data on sales and volumes of all pharmaceutical
products sold through the retail channel since 2001. We start by performing an aggregate analysis on
national bundles of goods, nding that a process of price convergence is detected after accounting for
possibly endogenous market dynamics, such as product churning and reallocation of products market
shares. In a second stage we switch to molecule-level data in order to control for product quality,
demanded volumes and national market competition, after the estimaton of quasi-hedonic prices.
Hence, we further conrm that convergence is veried, in both nominal and real prices, for the overall
sample and for products that are sold on the o¤-patent market only. However, we detect a strong
heterogeneity in the speed of convergence across therapeutic submarkets.
Finally, we focus on the relationship between observed price convergence, as an indicator of market
integration, and the sequence of country launches of innovative chemical compounds by pharmaceu-
tical companies. We nd that a faster therapeutic market integration correlates with longer country
delays, even after controlling for the average manufacturing price convergence in Europe. Moreover,
launches occur on average later in countries with lower incomes per capita. Interestingly, rst-in-class
compounds (i.e. compounds that exploit new pathways to treat a disease) tend to experience longer
delays than other drugs.
1The Court of Justice of the European Union has established a policy of community exhaustion of most forms
of intellectual property rights. The legal rationale resides in the free circulation of goods set by the Treaty of Rome,
establishing the European Economic Community (TEEC) in 1957. For more details, see Grigoriadis (2014).
2For more details, see also Towse et al. (2015).
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All our ndings point to the existence of welfare-reducing e¤ects arising from nationally fragmented
regulations. In the presence of ever increasing continental integration, rms can respond strategically
to preserve market fragmentation after lower expectations on prot margins, consequently reducing
their capacity to recover from high R&D sunk costs.3 They launch new drugs selectively, where
and when they are able to negotiate higher initial prices. They can also select by R&D intensity,
in therapeutic submarkets where expectations on competition are lower (Sutton, 1998). In this case,
national regulations, originally designed for allowing wider access to healthcare, end up with a patients
access problem, which is welfare-reducing by country and/or therapeutic markets.
We argue that the European Union is a peculiar challenge for the design of an e¢cient pricing
mechanism across countries, when regulation spillovers can cross national borders. The removal of any
trade barriers within Europe makes the arbitrage from cheapest locations easier, pushing companies
to respond strategically when selectively picking locations and therapies, hence trying to keep a level
of market fragmentation that allows them to recover from R&D sunk costs. Eventually, we argue that
an ad hoc degree of market segmentation by country should be possible, as a second-best option.
It would be a Pareto improvement, as long as it takes into account incentives for pharmaceutical
R&D, therapeutic value and consumer welfare.4 Our evidence supports the necessity of a value-based
pricing mechanism that takes into account heterogeneity within and across countries, combining both
an assessment of therapeutic value and a consideration of patientswillingness to pay, which is in line
with what is suggested by Danzon et al. (2013) and Towse et al. (2015). Also, a stronger role of
the European Medicine Agency is needed, when assessing the therapeutic value of a drug, as it could
reduce time to launch for more innovative drugs, avoiding longer negotiations between companies and
single national authorities.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next Section we review existing literature related to
our work. In Section 3 we introduce data and provide some descriptive statistics. In Section 4 we
present evidence of price convergence, rst on aggregate and then at the molecule level. In Section
5 we limit our investigation to newly marketed molecules and test access by price convergence and
country-specic characteristics. Section 7 concludes.
2 A review of existing literature
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the rst contribution that makes a systematic assessment of
pharmaceutical market integration in the European Union, looking at its impact on the di¤usion of
new and innovative products in member countries.
In general, it is widely acknowledged that the establishment of a European Common Market
initiated a process of continental economic integration leading to a generalized process of convergence in
incomes and prices across Europe. O¢cial data from Eurostat shows generalized price convergence for
a representative bundle of goods in the European Union5 over the last two decades, which becomes even
more pronounced when considering the access of new member countries after 2004. Price convergence
is predicted by the Law of One Price (LOP), which states that, in the absence of transport costs
and institutional barriers, a good must sell for the same price in all locations. In practice, prices
will convergence across countries at di¤erent speeds, conditional on the speed of barrier removal and
on local demand and supply peculiarities, showing a more or less volatile trend towards convergence
rather than a perfect linear process.6
3For the relationship between R&D activity and market structure, including peculiarities of the pharmaceutical
industry, we make reference to Sutton (1998).
4See Danzon et al. (2013) for a generalization of a value-based pricing mechanism that takes into account within and
across countries heterogeneity for patients willingness to pay.
5The coe¢cient of variation (%) of a typical household price index reported by Eurostat reduces from 42.6% to 25.6%
in the EU 27 countries in the period 1995 to 2012. From 32.4% to 25.6% in the period 2001-2012, which is the one we
consider for this contribution.
6For a seminal work on the conditional and unconditional Law of One Price, see among others Rogo¤ et al. (2001)
who test on over 700 years of decreasing trade costs. More recently, after using microdata, the Law of One Price has
been tested on subsets by industry and/or countries, taking into account implicit heterogeneity concealed by aggregate
price indexes. To name a few: Goldberg and Verboven (2005) for the European automotive industry; Cecchetti, Rogers
(2007) for a comparison between EU and US; Parsley and Wei (2001) for a test of the e¤ects of political borders as limits
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However, existing literature provides mixed evidence of convergence when focusing on pharma-
ceutical markets, while encompassing more limited sets of countries and/or therapeutic markets. For
example, Leopold et al. (2013) nds evidence of convergence but driven by single countries (Germany
and Greece) in a sample of 10 on-patent medicines for 5 years and 15 countries. Kanavos and Sotiris
(2011) observe price convergence for a set of 100 originator branded drugs in OECD countries but
only after restricting analysis to newer prescription medicines compared with older medicines over a
span of two years. Tymur (2011) nds convergence for the cardiovascular therapeutic class in ve
European countries in the period 1994-2003. Schulenburg et al. (2011) limit the analysis to ACE
inhibitors reaching no conclusion on the e¤ect of reference pricing mechanisms on country prices.
In contrast with the limited scope of previous studies, our paper makes a broad assessment of
the European market integration thanks to the use of pharmaceutical census data provided by IMS
Health. First of all, by including all therapeutic markets we can check for their relevance and weight
on a single countrys market. Then, we are able to include in our study both on-patent and o¤-patent
products, since the competition arising once the window of intellectual property protection expires can
itself be a driver of convergence. Following Danzon and Chao (2000), our estimates of quasi-hedonic
prices on a long span of time across countries not only control for attributes of chemical compounds
(pack, form, strength, age) marketed under di¤erent brands, but also allow us to concentrate on prices
net of market reallocation dynamics (competition, demand elasticity).
As in previous works on di¤usion of medicines, we assume that a delay in country launches of
new and innovative drugs represents a limit to healthcare access by national consumers. Nowadays,
pharmaceutical companies operate on a cross-country scale and face rather complex market choices.
Although a company might want to launch a new product in as many countries as possible, to recover
from high R&D sunk costs, previous studies demonstrate how companies actually market new chemical
compounds in less countries than expected, with delays that are conditional on both market and rm-
level characteristics. For example, Kyle (2007) shows how domestic status and previous experience in
the local market are important determinants in explaining product launches, in addition to market
characteristics. Danzon and Epstein (2012) nd that launch timing and prices of new drugs are
inuenced by prices of already established products, which are in turn a¤ected by a countrys own
regulatory system. Thus, they claim that external referencing policies adopted in high-price countries
can be welfare-reducing for low-price countries. Once again using prices of established products as a
proxy of regulation tightness, Kyle (2007) shows that rms headquartered in more regulated countries
eventually reach fewer alternative market destinations and are also less likely to launch in further
countries7. More specically, in the case of the Swedish market, Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) nd
that rms reduce prices by 12-19% for products that are subject to competition from parallel imports
in the period 1994-1999. With a global perspective, Lanjouw (2005) studies how world di¤erences in
legal and regulatory policies a¤ect whether new drugs are marketed in a country, and how quickly they
reach consumers. She nds that only less than one-half of new chemical compounds are eventually
marketed in all countries. Moreover, a lag of six or seven years can pass from one country launch to
the following one.
In the case of the European Union, we estimate comparable lags for countries launch hazards of
new chemical compounds. However, we also nd that these launch hazards are correlated with a faster
price convergence of the respective therapeutic markets, i.e. with a stronger market integration. This
result is robust after including rms and market characteristics. We argue that the force of European
market integration is a further determinant of possible country delays in health care access that has
been neglected until now.
In line with previous ndings, we also nd that lower expected prices are correlated with longer de-
lays. Here, we argue, prices of established products can be a poor proxy of country regulation tightness,
as they can be mainly a¤ected by local competitive pressures. We conrm, however, that low-income
countries su¤er on average from higher delays than richer countries, also within the European Union.
to the LOP that add to geographical distances.
7Several works have systematically investigated the peculiarities of cross-national static di¤erences in drug prices. See
for example Danzon and Furukawa (2011) for generic drugs, or Danzon and Chao (2002) for the overall e¤ect of national
regulatory regimes. The scope of our contribution is however to look at dynamic price di¤erences.
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Eventually, for a more e¢cient pricing policy in presence of negative spillovers, arising from na-
tional regulations, several studies call for some form of Ramsey (1927) pricing mechanism, which
would allow companies to discriminate explicitly on the basis of local demand and income character-
istics (Malueg and Schwars, 1994; Danzon and Towse, 2003; Szymanski and Valletti, 2005; Jack and
Lanjouw, 2005). More recently, Danzon et al. (2015) propose the adoption of a unique framework that
could combine an evaluation of therapeutic value, while following di¤erential pricing mechanism after
patients willingness to pay, within and across countries. In line with these works, we argue that a
national pricing policy is specically needed also within the European Single Market, which shall take
into account consumers welfare without disregarding companies economic incentives. By balancing
these two objectives, a policy granting some form of explicit price discrimination to companies might
allow for an overall Pareto improvement.
3 Data description
For the purpose of our analysis, we exploit a census of international product- and molecule-level data
collected by IMS Health, a consultancy rm, on quarterly revenue and volume sales over the period
from 2001Q3 to 2013Q1. Our sample includes 15 countries that are part of the European Common
Market8, where we can separate retail sales from hospital sales, and where on-patent and o¤-patent
status is reported over the entire period of analysis. We exclude sales to hospitals from our analysis
because we cannot exclude ex-post discounts that are dependent on actual products usage. We end up
with a sample of 6,773 chemical compounds that are marketed under 32,683 international products,
either on-patent or o¤-patent, for all therapeutic classes.
An important sample feature for our analysis is that details on retail sales and volumes are reported
by IMS Health as ex-manufacturer levels. Therefore, calculated prices do not need further adjustments
for national di¤erences in taxation and pharmacy markups.
Our basic unit of observation is the chemical compound (molecule), which is the unique active
ingredient that can be sold under di¤erent formulations, packages and strength, both within a country
and across countries. Hence, in the following analysis we will consider packages, formulations, and
strength as attributes of the same unique chemical compound. Sold quantities are originally expressed
as standard units9, which allow a comparison of sales and prices across solid and liquid formulations
of the same medication.
We calculate molecule prices for a single country as the sales-weighted average price of all molecule-
related products marketed in that country. Since we also include in our study countries that still adopt
their own currencies and not the euro, we convert original sales from national currencies using quartely
exchange rates provided by the European Central Bank to obtain nominal prices. Furthermore, we
obtain real prices after conversion by using quarterly real e¤ective exchange rates (REER) from Darvas
(2012).
For the second part of our contribution, where we analyze the e¤ects of price convergence on access
to innovative drugs, we identify a subset of 304 on-patent molecules (and 473 related products) that
are launched for the rst time in our sample of countries after 2001Q3. Note that these products could
still have been rst launched in a country outside our sample. However, we believe this is irrelevant
for our results as we are mostly interested in the determinants of specic country launches, rather
than the determinants of rst absolute launches.
Compounds newly launched in the European Union are then classied following what is done by
Lanthier et al. (2013), which covers new active ingredients approved by Food Drug Administration
(FDA), for marketing in the United States10. The classication includes three categories in descending
8 In the nal sample we have 10 members of the Euro area (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, France,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal) and 5 countries that still adopt their own currencies (Czech Republic, United Kingdom,
Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic). Originally, data for sales are provided in national currencies.
9A standard unit is the equivalent in millilitres of liquid preparations for a solid dosage of one tablet. For details on
denitions peculiar to health markets, see for example OECD (2014).
10The novelty of this classication stands in the review of sections for description and clinical pharmacology of
approved labeling by the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER). A cross-check for scientic validity of the
classication was made by experts working for CDER and FDA. For further details, see the Appendix B in Lanthier et
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order of innovation: i) rst-in-class; ii) advance-in-class and iii) addition-to-class. In our sample we
nd about 200 active ingredients marketed both in the EU sample countries and in US. Descriptive
statistics of launched molecules are reported in Table 4 and Table 5.
Macroeconomic data come from Eurostat regarding countries GDP per capita and overall price
convergence. The latter is already reported in o¢cial Eurostat data as the evolution of single countries
Purchasing Power Parities (PPP) relative to the rest of the European Union.
4 Price convergence
4.1 National baskets of medicines
In order to verify if a process of the European market integration is detected for the pharmaceutical
industry, and how fast it is, we proceed by building price indexes for national baskets of medicines,
and verify if they converge over time towards a European average.
For this purpose, we build a country-specic Laspeyres price index for each EU member country,
in the form:
Pct =
P
s
psct+1qsctP
s
psctqsct
(1)
where psct and qsct are respectively price and quantity sold (in standard units) of product s in
country c and quarter t. The benet of adopting a Laspeyres Index resides in the possibility to
exclude reallocation dynamics underlying the pharmaceutical market, focusing only on the within
price variation of each product, and taking xed the quantity consumed at the period before. To
obtain nominal prices we convert with nominal quarterly exchange rates to euro when the country is
not part of the euro-area, whereas to obtain real prices we convert with real e¤ective exchange rates
(REER) from Darvas (2012)11. Then, we build a similar index for the total market represented by all
15 countries in our sample, PEUt , considering products sold in at least one country.
In order to follow the evolution of prices in the European Single Market, we are interested in
tracking the ratio PRct = Pct=PEUt, which in the case of perfect convergence of one country c to the
rest of Europe is equal to one, since the representative medicine would sell at the same price in each
country.
In Figure 1, we report visual evidence of this time trend for real prices only, whereas in Table
1 we test the existence of a unit root, rst for all products, then excluding protected products, for
both nominal and real prices. The separate test for o¤-patent status allows us to control that the
process of convergence is not entirely driven by expiration of patent rights, after competition coming
from generics producers. For our test, we adopt the procedure set by Levin, Lee and Chu (2002) of
convergence over longitudinal observations.12 In our case we have a panel of 15 countries observed
over 46 quarters. Hence, as countries ratios to the EU average approach unity, they are reducing
distances from the others in the integrated market and the null hypothesis for the existence of a unit
root is rejected. On aggregate, we nd a process of economic integration, for which prices are aligning
across national borders. The process of price convergence is slightly more statistically signicant (i.e.
the t-statistics are higher) in the case of real prices, after deating for manufacturing real-e¤ective
exchange rates (REER).
al. (2013).
11Darvas (2012) built real e¤ective exchange rates (REERs) for 178 countries. They are made publicly available
by Bruegel, the Brussels-based economic think tank. Among the alternative methodologies provided there, we choose
the monthly indices for the manufacturing sector considering trade in euro. Since we have quarterly series for the
pharmaceutical industry, we average montly REERs by quarter.
12For previous applications of this procedure to assess price convergence in the European Single Market, see Goldberg
and Verboven (2003) in the case of the EU automotive industry, and Fischer (2009) for a comparison this and alternative
approaches. Tymur (2011) applied the methodology to test the cardiovascular submarket in ve EU countries.
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Figure 1: Visual evidence of real price convergence, all products, Laspeyres index ratio over 2001Q3
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4.2 Price convergence at the molecule-level
In a cross-country context, an accurate measurement of intertemporal price di¤erences has to take into
account both product and country peculiarities. Country price dispersions, either within a country or
across countries, can be due to quality di¤erences. A common solution is to estimate hedonic prices
that are able to catch and isolate the contribution of product attributes from market prices. This
is particularly relevant in the case of the pharmaceutical industry, where the main object of analysis
is a chemical compound, generally sold under di¤erent product names, with di¤erent dosages, pack-
ages and implicit therapeutic strength. Moreover, imperfect competition among products/molecules
with di¤erent qualities is further exacerbated by the recognition of patent rights to manufacturers,
which makes intertemporal and cross-national price di¤erences sensitive to switches from protected to
unprotected status, after which the degree of competition increases and prices decrease.
That is why we adopt a (quasi-)hedonic empirical strategy, with a system of two equations for
demand and supply features.13 In the end, we will exploit latter estimates of hedonic prices for testing
convergence, eventually net of locally observed demand and supply characteristics.
We start testing a simultaneous equation system (SEM), assuming that price and quantity may
be endogenous, in the form14:
ln pm(k)ct = p
 
Zm(k)c; Cm(k)ct

(2)
ln qm(k)ct = q
 
pm(k)ct; Tk;Hc

; (3)
13The use of a spurious hedonic regression that includes also variables for the extent of competition is justied by the
peculiarity of the pharmaceutical industry, with a high monopolistic power. For previous applications, see also Danzon
and Chao (2000).
14 In this we follow a two-stage least squares procedure suggested by Zellner and Theil (1962).
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Table 1: Unit root tests for beta-convergence of country vs European price indexes
All products Off-patent
Nominal prices
Adjusted t-statistic -9.992*** -9.956***
Real prices
Adjusted t-statistic -14.763*** -14.866***
*** stands for p < .001
where pm(k)ct is the mth molecule price in therapeutic class k, sold in country c and time t; qm(k)ct
is its sold quantity expressed in standard units; Zm(k)c is a set of quality controls including strength,
age, form and pack for the mth molecule in therapeutic class k sold in country c; Cm(k)ct is a set of
controls for competition including the (log of) number of generic competitors present in country c at
time t, and the (log of) number of therapeutic substitutes in c at time t in category k; Tk and Hc
are respectively a set of therapeutic and country xed e¤ects for time-invariant characteristics, which
may catch among others he e¤ect of cross-country di¤erences in regulations. Results for both nominal
and real prices are reported in Table 2.
In general, we observe that results for series of nominal and real prices are di¤erent in magnitude
of coe¢cients, but similar in terms of signs and statistical signicance. Among molecules attributes,
the variety o¤ered in strength and form is signicantly correlated with a higher price, as expected. A
higher range of possible prescriptions allows for a better use of an e¤ective drug and a higher implicit
value. A larger variety of product attributes is also a way for the rm to push back against price
convergence. Marketing the same product in two countries in a di¤erent form or dosage is a way
for the rm to articially raise a trade barrier, which might allow them to price-discriminate more
e¤ectively, and therefore keep prices higher. Conversely, rms might be more willing to engage in
these practices if the drug in question is particularly protable, so this coe¢cient might mask some
unobservable quality of the product. Molecule age is correlated to lower prices, consistent with the
hypothesis of a therapeutic life-cycle, with newer molecules that are more e¤ective than older ones.
The e¤ect of molecule age on prices seems to be more important on real prices, probably due to
the existence of an integrated market with a unique product life-cycle across national borders.that is
better caught after taking into account purchasing power parities by consumers.
Market competition from a larger set of generic competitors signicantly lowers prices, in line with
expectations and what is observed by Danzon and Chao (2000), whereas the presence of other thera-
peutic substitutes within an ATC 3-digit classication has a positive coe¢cient. This counterintuitive
result can be due to a love of variety e¤ect in the presence of monopolistic competition. In other
words, after already controlling in our specication for the presence of competitors that reportedly
drives down molecule prices, having more medications within the same therapeutic category implies
that national healthcare authorities acknowledge those products as being more di¤erentiated, while
addressing the same category of patients. Hence, the therapeutic submarket has an implicit lower
elasticity of substitution that allows producers to sell at higher prices.
The quasi-hedonic empirical model further allows for an estimation of overall elasticities of demand
to prices, reported on the rst line of second equation in Table 2. They are very similar for both nominal
and real price series (about :80), and they permit us to derive net prices, also of market reallocation
dynamics and of local demand characteristics.
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Table 2: Quasi-hedonic price regression, simultaneous demand and supply for nominal and real prices
SEM SEM
Nominal prices Real prices
First equation
Dependent variable: (log of) molecule price
QUALITY
(log of) strength .059*** .048***
(.006) (.006)
(log of) age -.024*** -.062***
(.009) (.010)
(log of) form .041*** .031***
(.005) (.004)
(log of) pack -.001 -0.007
(.003) (.025)
COMPETITION
(log of) generic competitors -.435*** -.300***
(.095) (.089)
(log of) therapeutic substitutes .095*** .077***
(.012) (.012)
Constant -1.001*** -.807***
(.398) (.140)
Adjusted R-squared .149 .407
Second equation
Dependent variable: (log of) standard units
(log of) molecule price -.710*** -.933***
(.054) (.020)
Constant 12.595*** 12.892***
(3.454) (.3550)
Therapeutical categories fixed effects Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared .417 .487
N. quarters 46 46
N. molecules 6,773 6,773
*** stands for p <.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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By now we are ready to employ previous estimates of quasi-hedonic prices, which we obtain as
residuals by combining eqs. 2 and 3, to test molecule price-convergence. The baseline equation is the
following:
 ln prm(k)ct = m(k)c +  ln prm(k)ct 1 +
LX
l=1
l ln prm(k)ct l + t+ "m(k)ct , (4)
where the dependent variable  ln prm(k)ct is the growth rate of country price ratios, calculated as
the ratio between price (pm(k)ct) of molecule m belonging to class k, marketed in country c at time t,
and an all-countries average price (pm(k)EUt) for the same molecule. As in the aggregate exercise of
the previous section, a decreasing ratio implies a convergence of the country price towards the Law of
One Price.15 Perfect market integration would imply price ratios equal to 1.
Regressors include the initial level of the same price ratio and a set of lags in growth rates (l  L).
A time trend t and country-molecule xed e¤ects (m(k)c) are included for controlling time-invariant
molecule features. The coe¢cient  is the main parameter of interest as it gives us an estimate for the
speed of (beta-)convergence. A half-life shock to price ratios can be calculated by   ln(2)= ln(1 + ),
which is the time it would take for an impulse response to a unit shock to dissipate by half. If there
were no convergence, the shock would be permanent.
To determine the more e¢cient number of lags L to include in our estimation, we follow Camp-
bell and Perron (1991)s top-down approach, reducing the number of lags until reaching statistical
signicance. We end up with an AR(1) process of L = 1. In Table 3 we report nested results before
reporting the full baseline specication.
Table 3: Molecule price convergence, all products, nominal and real prices nested specications
Dependent variable:
Δ(log of) price_ratioikt
(log of) price_ratioikt­1 ­.041*** ­.035*** ­.062*** ­.050*** ­.091*** ­.082***
(.003) (.003) (.004) (.004) (.008) (.009)
Δ(log of) price_ratioikt­1 ­.030*** ­.027*** ­.057*** ­.032*** ­.061*** ­.050***
(.010) (.008) (.012) (.009) (.010) (.011)
trend .002 ­.002*** .002 ­.002***
(.005) (.001) (.006) (.001)
Molecule*country fixed effects No No  No No Yes Yes
Therapeutic clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. quarters 46 46 46 46 46 46
N. molecules 6,773 6,773 6,773 6,773 6,773 6,773
Adj R­squared .031 .031 .029 .023 .032 .024
Half­life of a shock (quarters) 16.58 19.45 10.83 13.51 7.26 8.10
(in years) 5.53 6.48 3.61 4.50 2.42 2.70
Real prices &
trend & fixed
effects
Nominal prices Real prices
Nominal prices
& trend
Real prices &
trend
Nominal prices
& trend & fixed
effects
*** stands for p < .001, robust standard errors in parentheses.
15By construction, price ratios imply that a product is sold at least in two country markets in the same period.
This excludes entry and exit of chemical entities, which can be non-synchronized across markets. In fact, the possible
endogenous entry of new medicines is the object of following analyses.
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In all nested specications we detect a process of price convergence. Half-life shocks range from
2.5 to 6.5 years, faster in columns 6 and 7 when we introduced molecule-country xed e¤ects, possibly
catching some cross-border di¤erences for di¤erent local marketing strategies by companies.
On the other hand, we detect negative time trends when testing for real prices, i.e. after controlling
for countries purchasing power parity. We cannot exclude that nominal prices are more a¤ected by
volatility of nominal exchange rates, especially when including in the same sample both members
and non-members of the Eurozone, which can be subject or not to monetary policy adjustments.
Eventually, we adopt as a baseline the results in column 7, where a signicant negative trend is
detected after deation. We conclude that a process of price convergence across countries is conrmed
also at the molecule level, for real prices, and that a slight negative time trend indicates the convergence
towards the average is faster for higher prices, which on average o¤sets the increase in prices of cheaper
pharmaceutical compounds.
In order to account for the di¤erent compositions of the national pharmaceutical basket of pharma-
ceutical products, we now estimate eq. 4 at the ATC 3-digit level, which is the level of disaggregation
at which we assume a certain degree of homogeneity in the submarket exists in order to partition the
entire pharmaceutical market. We report a visual evidence of the assessed heterogeneity in speeds of
economic integration in Figure 2 for real molecule prices.
Figure 2: Visual evidence of estimates of molecule price convergence by therapeutic submarkets
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Note: Each point is a therapeutic market (ATC 3-digit) estimate, all statistically signicant at
least at 10%, with robust standard errors.
Indeed, a noteworthy dispersion of therapeutic estimates is registered around the cross-therapeutic
average represented here by the red line located at  :082 and borrowed from the last column of Table 3.
Among the least convergent therapeutic classes we nd Antipsychotics (N05A), Anxiolytics (N05B),
Hormonal contraceptives (G03A) and Drugs used in addictive disorders (N07B). Among the most
convergent, we nd Peripheral vasodilators (C04A), Drugs for obstructive airway diseases (R03A,
R03B), and Antiemorrhagics (B02A, B02B). Notably, no therapeutic class reports positive coe¢ents
(i.e. divergence), although some of them come very close to zero, but all with negative coe¢cients
(i.e. convergence) with statistical signicance.
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We conclude that a generalized process of market integration at the continental level is in progress,
albeit di¤erent in speed by therapeutic submarkets, once we control for local demand and supply
characteristics following quasi-hedonic prices. The rate of convergence in prices is so di¤erent across
therapeutic submarkets that the half-life shocks can range from 2 years to 6 centuries. Namely, besides
submarkets that still show a high level of market fragmentation, there are others that if left alone would
reach perfect integration very soon, for which a medicament would be sold at the same (real) price
throughout Europe.
This is not completely surprising, as this was the expected outcome after the establishment of a
European Single Market, due to the removal of tari¤ and non-tari¤ barriers and the free circulation
of goods and of a less-than-perfect free circulation of production factors like capital and labor. A
process of price convergence in the pharmaceutical industry is not necessarily bad news. It becomes
a problem if it is detrimental to the welfare of patients, in a market that is regulated on purpose to
allow as wide as possible access to medicines in the presence of high R&D sunk costs by companies.
In the next section we will assess which dimensions it can delay or prevent access to medicines across
countries and therapies.
5 Is market integration a¤ecting medicine di¤usion?
5.1 Some stylized facts
In the previous sections we established that a process of market integration for pharmaceutical products
does occur in the European Union. Now we want to test whether a higher level of market integration
correlates with access to medicines, once a¤ecting a companys decision in its sequence and timing of
country launches.
From our complete sample we identify a subset of 304 newly protected chemical compounds that
have been launched during or after 2001Q3 for the rst time in at least one of the 15 EU sample
countries. Note here that since we are not interested in determinants of the rst absolute launch after
clinical scrutiny, we exclude from our analysis medications that could be already available elsewhere
but not sold in any of our sample countries. What we assume at this stage is that a company has
already decided to market an innovative molecule in Europe, hence it has only to decide the sequence
of country launches that better maximizes its prots.
Table 4: Countries of rst launch and further di¤usion
Country
Launched
from
2001Q3 %
Diffusion as
in 2013Q1 %
Austria 15 4.94% 247 81.25%
Belgium 2 0.66% 146 48.03%
Czech Republic 8 2.63% 184 60.53%
Germany 120 39.80% 274 90.13%
Spain 7 2.30% 158 51.97%
Finland 28 10.20% 200 65.79%
France 6 1.97% 169 55.59%
United Kingdom 80 26.32% 220 72.37%
Greece 5 1.64% 190 62.50%
Hungary 2 0.66% 171 56.25%
Ireland 6 1.97% 183 60.20%
Italy 5 0.66% 151 49.67%
Poland 14 4.61% 177 58.22%
Portugal 5 1.64% 116 38.16%
Slovak Republic 1 0.00% 208 68.42%
304 100.00%
Launch of molecules and country diffusion
In Table 4 we provide some descriptive statistics on our subset of molecules. The rst and second
columns show how many molecules were launched rst in each country, whereas the third and fourth
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Figure 3: A median sequence of country launches, delays after rst launch in Germany
Note: Median between rst and third quartiles (on the graph) of lags by country
from launch in the German market. Numbers in brackets indicate number of
launched molecules.
columns exhibit their di¤usion by country at the end of the period. We already have a preliminary
evidence that a certain persistency exists for the rst locations, with two thirds of the new chemical
compounds marketed for the rst time in Germany or the UK16, although di¤usion of the same
compounds is eventually more uniform at the end of the period. Yet, Germany is still the country
where more launches occur, whereas in Portugal and Belgium there is a smaller portfolio of launched
products.
In Figure 3, we concentrate on the sequence of country launches. As Germany is the country with
the highest share of rst launches, we take it as reference to observe the median sequence, potentially
taking only 274 (out of a total 304) molecules that were launched at some time in Germany and reached
also other destinations in Europe. Hence, in Figure 3, on the vertical axis we measure the median
delay of each country from launch in Germany, between a rst and second quartile. In brackets, on
the horizontal axis, we also provide by country the number of molecules that were launched both there
and in Germany.
We observe two important stylized facts.
First, over our median sequence of launches there is a high degree of heterogeneity in access to
medicines. In many cases a molecule can reach a further country more than two years after launch
in Germany. In further launches, Austria, United Kingdom, Finland and Ireland have a narrower
distribution of lags, with a lower di¤erence between the rst and third quartile, when compared for
example to Poland, Czech Republic or Hungary, where besides some molecules that are launched after
three of four months we nd evidence of delays of two years.
Second, the di¤usion of medicaments for patients by country is also heterogeneous. As already
observed in Table 4, the di¤usion of new molecules can range from 38% in Portugal to 90% in Germany.
Eventually, only 19% of new molecules eventually reach all 15 sample countries, whereas about 25%
of new molecules still linger in the country where we observe rst launch, typically Germany and UK.
We clearly have a problem of time censoring until now, as a drug in our sample can be launched
later in our timeline of analysis, for which we have less time to observe further country launches. To
16Both Germany and UK have substantially revised pricing policy in our period of analysis. In principle, Germany
permits free pricing of on-patent drugs, while price regulation mainly relates to the way in which medicines are reimbursed
(Nolte and Ruggeri, 2013). It does not apply an external reference pricing scheme, although in 2011 an early benet
assessment has been introduced. The United Kingdom does not apply an external reference pricing rule, although it
prefers a scheme for prot controls, periodically negotiated between the Department of Health and the pharmaceutical
companies. The Scheme was updated in 2009 and, more recently, in 2013.
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control for time censoring, we visually report Kaplan-Meier (1958) estimates of survival functions17
by country in Figure 4, to represent the probability that a molecule has not been launched in a given
country after a certain period of time, i.e. it survived to a country launch. These estimates are non-
parametric in nature, since they do not control for possible determinants of di¤erent time to launch.
Still, they provide another snapshot of the heterogeneity of access to new medicines by country.
In Figure 4, we observe again remarkable di¤erences across countries, already from the rst months:
a representative compound is more likely launched in Germany, UK and Austria earlier than in other
countries. Notably, recent members of the European Union such as Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland
and Hungary register a higher probability to launch than for example France, Belgium, Italy and Spain.
Probably not by chance, the latter countries also rely on regulations where a form of negotiation with
companies plays an important role when launching a drug for the rst time. In the end, theres only
a 8% probability that a molecule already launched elsewhere is not sold also in Germany after eleven
years, compared to 63% in Portugal, which together with Belgium and Italy is still above the 50%
probability value at the end of our sample period. A log-rank test rejects the null hypothesis of an
equality of countries survival functions.
As we want to check for the therapeutic relevance of newly marketed molecules, we borrow from
Lanthier et al. (2013) a classication that includes three categories in descending order of innovative
content: i) rst-in-class; ii) advance-in-class; iii) addition-to-class.
First-in-class drugs exploit new pathways for the treatment of a disease, and we assume they are
more benecial for patients. Advance-in-class are drugs that are not rst-in-class, but were granted
priority review designation by the US Food & Drugs Administration (FDA), as they were acknoledged
to o¤er major advances in treatment. All other drugs are classied as simple additions-to-class, with
the least therapeutic value for patients.
Finally, we have a subset of drugs that do not match with the list by Lanthier et al. (2013). In
this case, we checked manually from reports of the European Medicine Agency that these are actually
marketed only in EU sample countries. As they didnt submit to evaluation by FDA, we cannot assess
their therapeutic value consistently with what done by Lanthier et al. (2013) and we will treat them
separately in our following analyses.
In Table 5 we observe that the majority of both rst-in-class and advance-in-class compounds are
enlisted under the category Antineoplastic and immunomodulating agents (ATC rst-digit category
L). In general, this anatomic therapeutic category collects also the majority of our sample launches.
On the other hand, once looking at innovative categories that cut across therapeutic categories, the
majority of new compounds falls under the simple addition-to-class column, as they were not considered
major breakthroughs by pharmacological experts.
5.2 Market integration, income, innovative content, and country delays
We are now ready to investigate if the remarkable di¤erences in launch delays observed until now,
both across countries and within countries by innovative content, may be driven by European market
integration, besides other local market and company characteristics.
For this purpose, we rely on a Cox (1972) proportional hazards procedure:
h(t=Xikc) = h0(t) exp(Xikcx) (5)
where h(t=Xikc) is the hazard rate for the ith molecule classied in the therapeutic category k and
possibly launched in country c.
In the vector Xikc of determinants we include: i) the rate of pharmaceutical price convergence
estimated after eq. 4 for each therapeutic market (ATC, 3-digit classication); ii) two binary variables
17We follow the classic non-parametric procedure set by Kaplan and Meier (1958), also known as the product limit
estimate of survival functions: bS(t) = Y
j=tj6t

nj dj
nj

, where nj is the number of new molecules that can be launched at
time tj , and dj is the number of launches at time tj . The product limit is calculated over all observed launches before
t. We calculate each product separately by country. These estimates are non-parametric in nature, since they do not
control for possible determinants of di¤erent time to launch. They provide a rst snapshot of the survival heterogeneity
by country.
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Figure 4: Survival to launch by country, Kaplan-Meier estimates.
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indicating whether the molecule is considered rst-in-class or advance-in-class, following Lanthier et
al. (2013); iii) the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) of each country c towards the rest of the EU
(EU27=100), sourced from Eurostat; iv) levels of country c real income (GDP) per capita; v) expec-
tations on prices and on volumes, proxied (in logs) by average prices and volumes of already marketed
molecules within the same k therapeutic submarket (see also with Danzon and Epstein, 2012); vi)
company sales in the kth therapeutic reference market, as a proxy of the companys bargaining power
against regulatory authorities in country c.
On the left side of Table 6 we report hazard ratios of nested specications, whereas on the right
side the reader can nd corresponding coe¢cients before exponentiating. A hazard lower than one
(i.e. a negative coe¢cient) implies a later-than-average launch, because the probability to survive to
market launch is higher than a representative in-sample medicine.
The speed of price convergence of each therapeutic submarket shows a statistically signicant
correlation with hazard ratios for launches, which is robust to the inclusion of controls in all speci-
cations. A percentage point of increase in speed of price convergence decreases the probability of a
country launch by (1   :873) t 13%. This relationship is even stronger in the case of molecules that
are considered most innovative for the treatment of diseases (1  :799) t 20%.
This result is consistent with the idea that companies have a disincentive to launch when the race
to the Law of One Price is too fast and hence expected prot margins are lower. The statistical pattern
is clear from the rst panel of Figure 5, where we visualize the post-estimation survival functions by
highest and lowest speed of convergence found in our sample distribution. Molecules that fall into
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Table 5: Innovative content of new active ingredients, based on a classication by Lanthier et al.
(2013)
Anatomic Therapeutic Classification Addition Advance First Unmatched Total
A ­Alimentary tract and metabolism 10 1 4 13 28
B ­ Blood and blood forming organs 5 3 3 10 21
C­ Cardiovascular system 14 3 8 12 37
D ­ Dermatologicals 2 0 5 7 14
G ­ Genito­urinary system 12 0 1 11 24
H ­ Systemic hormonal preparations,
excluding sex hormones and insulins 0 0 3 3 6
J ­ Antiinfectives for systemic use 12 12 8 2 34
L ­ Antineoplastic and
immunomodulating agents 8 18 27 10 63
M ­ Muscolo­skeletal system 2 0 4 10 16
N ­ Nervous system 14 1 4 14 33
P ­ Antiparasitic products, insecticides
and repellents 0 0 0 1 1
R ­ Respiratory system 4 0 1 8 13
S ­ Sensory organs 4 6 1 3 14
Total 87 44 69 104 304
the highest convergent therapeutic classes have a probability of about 60% to survive to launches (i.e.
only about 40% of probability to be launched).
Similarly, in the second panel of Figure 5 we report a visualization of estimates for survival functions
by innovative content alone and in presence of average price convergence. There, we observe a clear
ranking as most innovative drugs are on average launched later than advance-in-class, even more so
in presence of price convergence.
The latter nding suggests that a problem of access to medicines, as a consequence of delays in
launch and/or partial di¤usion, is not limited to drugs that have already several competitors, and for
which marketing might not be worth the xed cost of market entry.
Rather, we argue, expectations of decreasing prices in the case of molecules that are more R&D
intensive can be an additional deterrent for pharmaceutical companies, which may prefer to segment
the market as long as possible, to harvest prots rst where the expected prices are higher. Indeed,
from our data we already observe that most of them (71 out of 96) are rst launched in Germany,
United Kingdom, and Finland, which are also the countries with the highest income per capita in our
sample. We nd a positive shift of the baseline hazard rate (i.e. a negative shift of the survival rate)
when the income per capita is higher, which means that a representative molecule is launched earlier
in richer countries than in poorer countries.
Moreover, rst-in-class drugs are more di¢cult to evaluate at rst country launches and this adds
further delay to country launches. This is evident from the panel b) of Figure 5, where we plot
post-estimation survival functions for rst-in-class, advanced-in-class and rst with convergence. The
higher is the innovative content that the producer claims, the more di¢cult can take negotiations for
pricing and reimbursement because there are fewer appropriate benchmarks than simple advance or
addition to pharmacological classes.
Local market expectations, for demand and price, are in line with previous ndings by Danzon,
Wang andWang (2005). The higher the expected prices and volumes, the higher the launch probability.
Finally, larger and diversied companies tend to launch earlier since they have already experience of
the market and its regulation.
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Table 6: Cox proportional hazards model for country launch delays
Dependent variable : Cox I Cox II Cox III Cox IV Cox I Cox II Cox III Cox IV
hazard rate of launch
pharma convergence .881** .879** .911** .873** -.127** -.129** -.093** -.135**
(.050) (.050) (.037) (.030) (.057) (.057) (.040) (.063)
first * pharma convergence .799** -.223**
(.036) (.105)
advanced * pharma convergence .802* -.221*
(057) (.117)
purchasing power parity (EU=100) .918** .916** .933* .937* -.085** -.088** -.069* -.065*
(.009) (.030) (.034) (.034) (.033) (.033) (.036) (.036)
(log of) GDP per capita 1.158*** 1.145** 1.142** .146*** .135** .133**
(.051) (.067) (.072) (.044) (.059) (.063)
(log of) expected price 1.053** 1.053** .051** .052**
(.019) (.022) (.018) (.021)
(log of) expected volume 1.055*** 1.057*** .054*** .056***
(.015) (.016) (.014) (.016)
(log of) firm sales 1.064*** 1.061*** .062*** .059***
(.015) (.016) (.014) (.015)
first in class 1.007 .007
(.146) (.145)
advanced in class 1.226 .204
(.220) (.179)
N. molecules 304 304 304 304 304 304 304 304
N. events 4,560 4,560 4,560 4,560 4,560 4,560 4,560 4,560
N. therapeutic class 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101
Errors clustered by therapy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Likelihood ratio chi2 9.04** 20.91*** 68.19*** 83.39*** 9.04** 20.91*** 68.19*** 83.39***
Hazard ratios Coefficients
Note: Hazard ratios on the left and coe¢cients on the right, delta method for clustered
standard errors. Breslow method for tied launches. Here above, *, **, *** stand respectively for
p <.100, p <.050, p < .001, robust standard errors in parentheses.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we nd that the race towards European market integration is correlated with a persistent
divergence in access to medicines across countries. The faster the convergence towards the Law of One
Price, the greater the delay in launches of innovative drugs, especially in countries with lower income
per capita.
More in detail, we provide evidence that despite fragmented national pricing policies and regula-
tions, convergence of pharmaceutical prices has been fast across Europe, albeit at a granular level it
can di¤er across therapeutic areas and product segments.
We nd that a faster cross-country convergence in pharmaceutical prices is detrimental to the
welfare of patients/consumers. There are two main reasons why this may be the case. First, since prices
in low-income countries are converging upwards, while prices in high-income countries are converging
downwards, faster than actual income convergence, patients/payers from low-income countries are
paying more for medicines, and this burden o¤sets the decline in prices paid by patients/payers in
high-income countries. Secondly, if price convergence results in longer than expected launch delays,
we have the paradox that European economic integration is negatively a¤ecting patient access to
medicines.
These two trends come with a distorted system of incentives for companies, which react by launch-
ing new drugs selectively by country and therapeutic markets. Although manufacturers would prefer
to launch instantaneously their products in as many countries as possible, the regulatory environment
17
Figure 5: Post-estimation: survival rates for most and least convergent markets, and by innovative
content
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forces them to trade-o¤ faster launches and larger market size with lower prices. Against this back-
ground, it is not surprising that launch delays are stronger for more innovative drugs, due to higher
sunk costs in R&D.
In general, it is a complex problem to nd a way towards an e¢cient design for a pricing mechanism
in presence of interdependent markets, when negative regulation spillovers among countries occur.
Within the European Union, we argue, the negative spillovers are even more evident, since no trade
barrier exists, while pricing and reimbursement decisions are responsibility of each Member State.
A rst attempt towards a solution would be a stronger role for the European Medicine Agency
(EMA) in producing guidelines for the therapeutic assessment of new drugs. It would already reduce
part of the uncertainty of negotiations on this point, between pharmaceutical companies and national
authorities. In the medium term, a policy that allows for a regulated price discrimination across
Member States has to be considered a second best solution, as a legitimate consequence of di¤erent
country demand and income characteristics. Therefore, companies and payers could segment markets
together with a formula coordinated among countries, for example following the suggestion by Danzon
et al. (2013) and Towse et al. (2015). In this way, a di¤erential pricing system would at the same time
improve patientswelfare, while taking into adequate consideration companieseconomic incentives to
recover from high R&D and marketing sunk costs.
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